ON BECOMING, COSMIC TIME AND ROTATING UNIVERSES by Dorato, Mauro
 1
Forthcoming in C. Callender (ed.), Time Reality and Experience (provisional title), Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Series, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
ON BECOMING, COSMIC TIME AND ROTATING UNIVERSES1 
Mauro Dorato 
Dipartimento di Filosofia 
Università di Roma Tre 
Via Ostiense 234, 00146 Rome, Italy 
e-mail: dorato@uniroma3.it 
 
Abstract 
In the literature on the compatibility between the time of our experience and the time of 
physics, the special theory of relativity has enjoyed central stage. By bringing into the 
discussion the general theory of relativity, I suggest a new analysis of the misunderstood 
notion of becoming, developed from hints in Gödel’s published and unpublished 
arguments for the ideality of time. I claim that recent endorsements of such arguments, 
based on Gödel’s own “rotating” solution to Einstein’s field equation, fail: once 
understood in the right way, becoming can be shown to be both mind-independent and 
compatible with spacetime physics. Being a needed tertium quidbetween views of time 
traditionally regarded as in conflict, such a new approach to becoming should also help to 
dissolve a crucial aspect of the century-old debate between the so-called A and B theories 
of time. 
 
 
1. Introduction: the shift from STR to GTR and the centrality of becoming 
 
In the literature on the relationship between the time of our experience and the time of 
physics, the special theory of relativity (STR) has curiously but undoubtedly played a major 
role. On the assumptions that  
(i) becoming (the “flow of time”) is the essential feature of experienced time;  
(ii) objective (i.e. mind-independent) becoming presupposes an ontological difference 
between present and future events or state of affairs;  
(iii) the geometrical structure presupposed by STR is a necessary constraint that 
physical time in general must meet,  
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a solution to the problem of the definability of becoming in Minkowski spacetime has also 
been regarded as the main way to solve the question of the compatibility between the time of 
physics and the time of our experience.2  
However, while (i) and (ii) above can be regarded as plausible, (iii) should strike us as 
suspicious, especially when it is used to claim that if Minkowski spacetime cannot make 
room for any sort of “ontological difference” mentioned in (ii), then becoming must be 
considered to be mind-dependent. An endorsement of the truth of the antecedent of this 
conditional is usually assumed to have consequences also for the phil sophyof time one 
should adopt. For instance, to the extent that a commitment to a nd-independent becoming 
is regarded as the essential tenet of the so-called A (or “dynamic”) theories of time, those of 
their B (“static”) rivals that treat past, present and future events as being ontologically on a 
par would be vindicated by the geometrical requirements of Minkowski spacetime.3 On the 
contrary, if some sort of primitive relation of becoming – appropriately relativized to points 
or worldlines – could be defined in terms of the structure of Minkowski spacetime, the 
compatibility between becoming and STR would be demonstrated, and no choice between the 
A and the B theories of time would be possible only on the basis of physics.  
To an unbiased reader, however, such an exclusive worry with STR should appear as 
puzzling, and in need of a justification. True enough, Minkowski spacetime is the standard, 
flat spatiotemporal arena for contemporary quantum field theories, but since in the presence 
of gravitating matter STR does not yield an accurate description of physical reality, it cannot 
be viewed – as (iii) obviously presupposes – as a fundamental physical theory. Considering 
that within the general theory of relativity (GTR), STR has only a “tange tial” validity,4 why 
should we assume that the properties of time that are characteristic of the latter theory also 
apply to the former? More generally, why should we assume that time has the same 
properties across different physical theories?  
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Notably, Weyl [1918, p. 220], Eddington [1920, p. 163], Jeans [1936] and Gödel [1949a] 
were all aware of the fact that the special relativistic limitations vis à vis the absence of a 
distinguished, global time order can be regarded as a “local phenomenon”. In fact, the 
presence and the actual distribution of matter in the large-scale structure of the universe may 
«largely destroy the equivalence of different observers, and distinguish some of them from 
the rest, namely those which follow in their motion the mean motion of matter» (Gödel 
[1949a, p. 559/1990, p. 204]). Unfortunately, in much of the recent literatu  such an 
important point seems to have been lost.5 O e of the main aims of this paper is to redress the 
balance, by relocating the discussion about becoming and physical time in the more 
appropriate context of GTR and of cosmological models in general.6  
Besides having being too absorbed by the infinitesimal, “tangential” features of 
Riemannian spacetimes, I think it is fair to add that the philosophical literature has never 
yielded a clear and convincing analysis of the rather obscure notion of becoming, something 
which has contributed to generate a widespread – but, in my opinion, totally ungrounded – 
belief in the incompatibility between the time of physics and the time of our experience. Such 
an obscurity has also affected the formulations of the two major theories that have divided the 
analytic 20th century philosophy of time. As it is should be clear from the above presentation, 
I take it that the real contention between the “A” and the “B” theories of time does not
concern the truth conditions of tensed sentences (as Faye [1989] and Mellor [1998] have it), 
or the relational versus the monadic nature of tenses (as Horwich [1987] among others has it). 
In spite of the obvious importance of these questions, in the following I will take for granted 
that the crucial, still open rift between the two camps concerns the natu e of change and the 
mind-independence of becoming.7 Especially within the recent attempts at grounding a 
quantum theory of gravity, time seems to have lost the independence it had acquired w h 
respect to change in the complex historical path that led from Plato to Newton (see Smith 
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[2000, p. 928-9]), and today it seems appropriate to regard the notion of time as being 
inextricably linked to that of change.   
Given the importance of a correct understanding of becoming for this project, I plan to 
begin by proposing a new analysis of such a notion, to be regarded, on the wake of Gödel 
[1949a], simply as the successive occurrence (coming into being) of tenselessly conceived 
facts or events (§2). Armed with such a much needed t rtium quid between the traditional 
ontological requirements of the A and the B theories of time, I will then show that both 
Gödel’s argument against the reality of time based on his famous “rotating universes”, and its
recent reconstructions by Savitt [1994] and Earman [1995], fail (§3 and §4). Despite the fact 
that physics in principle cannot yield a sufficientcondition for the tenseless coming into being 
of events at instants of cosmic time which becoming consists in, I claim that the cosmological 
model currently adopted by physicists is completely consistent with it and with the 
requirements of experiential time, once the latter has been correctly explicated. Finally, by 
showing that my explication of becoming is faithful to our pre-theoretical intuitions about it 
and does not run into notorious paradoxes entailed by “the moving now”, I conclude with a 
simple argument in favor of its objectivity (§5). 
 
2. The nature of becoming and Gödel’s argument for the ideality of time 
 
Gödel’s argument against the reality of time, which appeared in Schilpp’s volume in honor 
of Einstein (Gödel [1949a]), is based on the discovery of a new solution to Einstein’s field 
equation, notoriously encompassing the existence of closed timelike curves (Gödel [1949b]). 
The argument is important not only for the conclusion it – un uccessfully, as we will see –
tries to support, but much more for the brilliant analysis of controversial philosophical 
notions that it provides; from this point of view, it has certainly not received the attention it 
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deserves.8 Besides Yourgrau’s pioneering work on Gödel’s philosophy of time [1991, 1999], 
which had the great merit of taking into account also Gödel’s unpublished material, there are 
as of now two conflicting reconstructions of Gödel’s argument for the ideality of time, 
Savitt’s [1994] which endorses it, and Earman’s [1995, pp. 194-200], which rejects it, and 
somehow considers it unworthy of much attention.  
Part of the neglect of this argument in comparison to the ques ion of time travel, also raised 
by Gödel’s model, can be explained by the fact that Gödel’s argument is incomplete and 
“gappy” to say the least, as it appears to be centered around the cryptic claim that since there 
is no objective lapse of time in his rotating universe, there is no objective lapse of time in our 
world either, the main difference between the two models depending only on the way matter 
is contingently distributed and moves. More specifically, in our universe, unlike Gödel’s, 
matter is not everywhere rotating (as Gödel put it, «the compass of inertia does not rotate 
around galactic matter»), though the physical laws given by Einstein’s equations are the 
same, as Gödel’s model satisfies them. Interestingly, Gödel discovered that the lack of 
rotation is sufficient to define a global temporal order (see Malament [1995, p. 263]), since 
the congruence of worldlines of matter corresponding to the major mass points of the 
universe can be compared to the strands or the fibers of a rope representing spacetim . 
Absence of twisting, which corresponds to null rotation, is sufficient to slice through the rope 
with a plane which is orthogonal to every fiber of the rope and the collection of all such 
planes is called “cosmic time”.  
To philosophers of space and time, it is indeed reassuring to find out that Gödel’s interest 
in general relativity was philosophical in origin, as his mathematical work on time «was 
spurred by his interest in Kant’s philosophy of space and time rather than by his frequent 
talks with Einstein», which in any case began only in 1942 (Wang [1995], p. 216). In fact, in 
his “Lecture on rotating universes” [1990, p. 274], Gödel himself tells us that he was 
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motivated to find his new “rotating solutions” to Einstein’s field equation to reb t an 
argument due to Jeans [1936], in which it is maintained that the general theory of relativity 
has reestablished the possibility of an “objective lapse of time”.9  
In order to thoroughly understand the argument I am about to present below, two 
terminological points are appropriate. First, it is important to keep in mind that the notion of 
change that Gödel introduces in the argument is at variancewith much of the analytic 
tradition in the philosophy of time, since it requires an objective coming to existence of 
facts or events ( his coming into existence he calls: “the lapse of time”). While within such a 
tradition change presupposes just the possession of two incompatible properties exemplified 
by the same p rduring entity at two different times, Gödel’s notion of change is tantamount 
to an objective coming into being, and is to be regarded as an essenti l feature of the time of 
our experience. In a passage in the manuscript B2, where Gödel summarizes the result of his 
investigation into the structure of time in STR [1995, p. 236], he writes «what remains of 
time in (special) relativity theory as an objective reality inherent in the things neither has the 
structure of a linear ordering nor the character of flowing or allowing of change. Something 
of this kind, however, can hardly be called time ( y italics)». In other words, according to 
Gödel, time is real only if both a linear ordering and an objective lapse exist independently of 
observers.  
The second remark is that in the published piece [1949a], he defends also the converse 
claim that change presupposes an objective lapse of time. These two claims together imply 
that time is real if and only ifa change in the existing is real. This equivalence eliminates the 
charge of circularity in the first th ee premises of the argument below, and justifies in 
particular its first premise (0), which in the published paper has no textual support, but is 
obviously assumed for the sake of the conclusion about the ideality of time.  
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Whenever possible, each premise of the argument – whose reconstruction owes much to 
both Earman’s and Savitt’s – is upported by textual quotations from Gödel’s published work 
[1949a]. Partial conclusions deduced from previous premises are in bold types: 
 
GÖDEL’S ARGUMENT AGAINST T HE REALITY OF TIME  
      
Part I 
 
(0) Time is real only if change is real.  
(1) Change is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time. 
«change becomes possible only through the lapse of time» (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202) 
 
(2) Time is real only if there exists an objective lapse of time [fro  (0) and (1)] 
(3) «The existence of an objective lapse of time means or at least is equivalent to the fact, 
that reality consists of an infinity of layers of “now” which come into existence 
successively» (1949a, p. 558/1990, p. 202).  
(4) Reality consist of an infinity of layers of “now” which come into existence successively 
only if spacetime admits of a global time function(cosmic time). 
(5) Time is real only if spacetime admits of a global time function [from (2), (3) (4)] 
(6) Gödel’s rotating-model M, qua solution to Einstein’s field equations, is a physically 
possible model, and despite the presence of closed timelike curves (circular time) and 
looming grandfather paradoxes, cannot be ruled out a priori.
(7) Since for every x in M, x chronologically precedes itself, M does not possess a global 
time function.  
(8) In the physically possible world M, time is ideal   [from (5) (6) (7)]  
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part II 
 
(9) The main, contingent, non-lawlike difference between M and our universe is given by 
the (probable) absence of a net rotation of matter, which implies the existence of cosmic 
time in our world 
(10)?  
___________________________________________ 
(C) Time in ideal also in our universe 
 
  
Two obvious questions must be answ red in order to see whether Kant’s theory of an ideal 
(transcendental) time is really vindicated by Gödel’s rotating universes, as the Austrian 
logician had it: (i) is the first part of the argument valid? (ii) if it is, how do we bring its 
conclusion to bear on the status of time in our u iverse, which does not seem to show any 
rotation of the kind required by Gödel’s model (the second part of the argument)? The second 
question is clearly linked to the problem of filling the premise (10). 
 
3 The first part of Gödel’s argument 
 
The unanimous opinion of commentators is in favor of the conclusion of part I of the 
argument, which proves that in Gödel’s universe time is ideal, or mind- pendent. However, 
some of the premises in my reconstruction, which differs from Savitt’s and Earman’s, might 
be regarded as controversial.  
For instance, and firstly, it could be objected that (1) – and therefore (2) – are not 
plausible, as they imply the dubious theory of an absolute change in what exists, rather than 
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an ordinary, qualitative change of what already (tenselessly) exists, as in “the party became 
boring” or “the traffic light became red”. Absolute change in this sense is what Gödel called 
“a change in the existing”, already distinguished from qualitative change by C. D. Broad long 
ago: «To “become present” is, in fact, just to “become”, in an absolute sense; i.e., to “come to 
pass” in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply, to “happen”. Sentences like “This water 
became hot” or “This noise became louder” record facts of qualitative change. Sentences like 
“This event became present” record facts of “absolute becoming”» [Broad 1938, p. 280]. To 
counter this first objection to Gödel, it is then important to keep in mind that “change” as 
used in premise (0) refers to absolute change (absolute becoming) in Broad’s sense, to be 
carefully distinguished from a qualitative change of events losing the (pseudo-attribute of) 
“being future” and becoming present. 
Secondly, it might be objected that (2) implies the dubious “moving now” c nception of 
time (see Earman [1995] and Savitt [1994, p. 468]), since it is always possible to ask “how 
fast does the absolute change in what exists occur?” However, as anticipated earlier, I argue 
that the claim that instantaneously conceived events (or facts) “come into existence” at a 
certain time (the “objective lapse of time” in the above argument) is simply equivalent to the 
claim that hey mind-independently occur at that time. Consequently, Gödel’s locution 
“events come into existence succ ssively” should really be read simply as “events (mind-
independently) take place  one after the other at their time of occurrence”.  
In a word, as I interpret it, the objective lapse of time or the “change t  existing” referred 
to by Gödel amounts to the rather non-metaphysical, almost self-evident claim that if “event 
E occurs (or, equivalently, tenselessly exists) at time t”, at a later or earlier time t’, other 
events occur (exist)10. This means that, at time ’, the set of existing events includes events 
other than those existing at t. With this stipulation, our language regimented in a logical way 
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would have a domain of quantification for each time, containing only those entities that then 
exist. 
To come now to the charge that an objective coming into being, or the “flow (lapse) of 
time” as it is interpreted here, implies the fallacious “moving now”, note that one could 
simply point out that the absolute change in what exists is no ordinary change, and as such, it 
does not conceptually depend on other notions as the latter does.11 The reason why it is simply 
meaningless to ask “how fast does such a change in the existing occur?” is given by the fact 
that the notions that are synonymous of becoming or “coming into existence”, namely 
“occurring” or “happening”, are not further analyzable; in any case, they don’t presupposes a 
perduring entity and a pair of incompatible properties possessed by the same entity at 
different times as the qualitative notion of change does. It is only in the ordinary sense of 
change – the qualitative change of, say, a piece of iron becoming rusted – that one can talk 
about the rate of change, since any change in time can be slow or fast (a slow aging or 
rusting, a fast aging or rusting). Of a change of time, one cannot even say that it occurs – 
though it can be regarded it as a feature of the universe quite independent of our minds – 
since, strictly speaking, it is only events that can occur at times, and their succeeding one 
another at different times is not an event, if the latter is defined as an instantaneous entity as 
is customary in relativity. 
A third objection a tenseless theorist of time might have against (1) above is that it ignores 
the tenseless aspect of time. According to the tenseless theorist, events are mind-
independently before one another, even though they are given in block, because they don’t 
become, or don’t come into being or cease to exist (the block universe). In a word, for certain 
B theorists like Mellor and Faye, tenseless temporal relations – and therefore, in a sense, time 
– are real even if the lapse of time usually advocated by the A camp (i.e., the coming into 
existence of events) is mind-dependent, so that (2) is false. 
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As a reply to this third criticism, note that even if we changed (2) above by requiring that 
(2)’ Time is real only if the distinction between before and after is mind-ind pendent 
(objective), 
a tenseless theorist would still have a harsh destiny in M. G ven the existence of closed 
timelike curves for any point of Gödel’s spacetime, an observer whose spatiotemporal carrier 
coincided with a segment of such curves would have no justification for claiming that 
beforeness or afterness is mind-independent. Events of type E that she would experience as 
being before events F, on a closed timelik  curve would also be such that F is before E, so 
that, in such a Gödelian world, temporal betweenness would seem the only objective relation 
«inhering in events». Consequently, as Kant had it, in Gödel’s universe it would be plausible 
to assume that time as we experience it emerges from the relation of our faculty of perception 
with the «things in themselves», which established the conclusion of the first part of the 
argument. 
In order to give further arguments in favor of premise (2), it is of paramount importance to 
keep in mind that when Gödel refers to “time”, he always means “the time of our 
experience”, or «what everybody understood by time before relativity theory existed» (1990, 
manuscript C1, p. 247). In particular, this implies that, in any case, premise (1) – and (2) – do 
not purport to say something about physical time or the metaphysics of time in general, but 
only about mental, experienced time. Considering that the overarching purpose of Gödel’s 
paper is to reevaluate Kant’s theory of time and show that it is not only compatible with 
relativity but even vindicated by it – as is also clear from the opening paragraphs of the two 
manuscripts preceding [1949a] – premise (1) needs no justification from the moving-now 
conception of time, as Earman speculates [1995, p.199]. Premise (1) is assumed only to prove 
that if spacetime does not make room for a necessary condition for objec ve(mind-
independent) coming into being, namely cosmic time, Kant’s thesis about the ideality of time 
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would be correct, against the prevailing opinion of 20th century philosophers of space and 
time.12  
A fourth controversial point of the first part of Gödel’s argument might concern the 
condition of globality: one could object that in the spacetime of general relativity, such a 
condition may not be necessary to the existence of a lapse of time, and therefore question 
premise (4) above. One could conceive a local, mind-independent coming into being along 
single worldlines also in a Gödelian universe, not matched by analogous phenomena at a 
cosmic scale. Likewise, the absence of an invariant, global time order in STR could be 
compensated by a worldline- ep ndent becoming, as is proposed by Clifton and Hogarth 
[1995]. 
In the same fashion, for example, Boltzmann thought that the universe could be in a global 
state of thermal equilibrium, while some regions, large as a cluster of galaxies, could be 
characterized by gigantic, rare fluctuations, due to which, for some billions of years, 
observers would reckon an increase of entropy, and therefore some sort of objectively 
irreversible phenomena (Boltzmann [1896-98/ 964]). Would we deny that entropy grows in 
those regions simply because at a larger scale, both spatially and temporally, the universe is 
in equilibrium? I doubt it. But then, w y can’t we say that some sort of local becoming takes 
place in a mind-independent way? 
Gödel would probably object that by admitting a local coming into being, where “local” 
here has the same sense it had in Boltzman’s “pockets of increasing entropy lasting for eons”, 
we would make a change in the existing – the lapse of time – r lative to particular worldlines, 
i.e., to some possible observers living in a galaxy. And then, he would add: «The concept of 
existence (...) cannot be relativized without destroying it  meaning completely» [1949a 
559/1990, 223, fn. 5]. 
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However, note that if we cannot relativize the concept of existence, an examination of the 
impact of the special and the general theory of relativity on our ordinary notion of time would 
be meaningless since, independently of relativistic considerations, such a relativization is 
implicit in the very idea of a lapse of time even according to Gödel. In our experience, as he 
wrote, we often assert of the same event that «it exists and it does not exist, at two different 
instants of time». Furthermore, without such a relativization, we would be subject to some 
form of McTaggart’s paradox about events being present (existent) and non-present (no  
existent) at the same time. These remarks are of paramount i por ance, since not only do 
they entail that a relativization of tenses is necessary, but also that it does not lead us to a 
view of becoming that is too deflated to be worth having (see Callender [1997, p.118]). 
Elsewhere (Dorato [1995]), I have argued that there cannot be a futureevent in an absolute 
sense, since an event can count as future only relatively to some present event or other, and 
human existence appears always temporally located and perspectival, that is, experienced at 
each instant of time from the perspective offered by that instant. Here, let it suffice to say 
that, beyond the possibility it offers of re-e tablishing a compatibility with physical time, the 
main reason why one wants to defend such a perspectival, relational understanding of 
existence in time is that without it we could not make room and explain our capacity to 
literally bring about a future event by acting in the present: “making things happen” 
presupposes that events that are yet to occur and are brought about by our efforts do not 
(tenselessly) exist relatively to the moment of action. If they did, our action and our 
experience of passage would be both illusory, and utterly unexplainable.
Granting the possibility of relativizing the concept of existence in this sense, a much more 
plausible defense of the condition of globality is that, by rejecting it at least in the context of 
Gödels’s spacetime, we would make the lapse of time non-in ersubjectively valid: «in 
whatever way one may assume time to be lapsing there will always exist possible observers 
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to whose experienced lapse of time no objective lapse corresponds (in particular possible 
observers whose whole existence objectively would be simultaneous)» (Gödel 1949a 561/ 
1990, 205-6). Gödel here refers to hypothetical observers O1, whose worldlines lie beyond a 
certain critical point P of his spacetime model, characterized by the fact that the light cones at 
P are tangent o the hyperplane of simultaneity determined by those observer (call them O) 
that are located in the conventionally chosen axis of rotation of Gödel’s universe. Since, 
beyond P, O1’s closed worldlines belong to a hypersurface of simultaneity determined by O, 
O1’s whole existence along the circular time-like curve would be simultaneous with a 
particular instant in O’s existence.13 In view of this peculiarity of Gödel’s spacetime, I take 
that in the context of the argument under discussion it is plausible to grant Gödel’s implicit 
condition of globality, in such a way that an objective lapse of time must be a lapse for all 
possible observers (worldlines) of the spacetime. In a word, making a reasonable “equation” 
between a possible observer and a worldline, within Gödel’s cosmological model the 
objectivity of becoming must imply its intersubjective validity.  
We can therefore conclude that if we lived in Gödel’s universe, we should be Kantian 
about time, since both the difference between earlier and later and that between present and 
future would be mind-dependent. 
 
4 The second part of Gödel’s argument: why the epistemic defense fails
 
How does the valid conclusion of the first argument impinge on the way we should 
understand time in our universe, where the distribution of matter is different? There are two 
possible interpretations of Gödel’s argument, an episemic one and a metaphysical-modal 
one, pointing to the necessary grounding of cosmic time in the laws of nature. Here I will 
limit myself to the former interpretation, which is essentially due to Yourgrau [1991] and 
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Savitt [1994]. Not only is this choice mtivated by the fact that it has generated more 
discussion than the latter, but also by the remark that the metaphysical interpretation has 
unanimously been regarded as being extremely difficult to justify. 
Suppose, with Savitt [1994], that in a physically po sible Gödelian model, there are 
inhabitants like ourselves measuring a local time tL in the local «compass of inertia», in such 
a way that whenever x temporally precedes y for any two events i  the galaxy where the 
Gödelians live, tL(x) < tL(y). Then it could be argued that the direct experience of time of the 
Gödelians is exactly like ours. On the basis of this remark, Savitt has thus reconstructed 
Gödel’s reasoning: 
 
(10) it is possible to have direct experience of time just like ours in a universe in which (as 
in M) there is no objective lapse of time;     [recall (8)] 
(11) such an experience provides the only reason to suppose that there is an objective lapse 
of time in our universe; 
(12) «our direct experience of time provides no reason to suppose that there is an 
objective lapse of time in our universe»     [from 10 and 11] 
(13) «Since there is no objective lapse of time in M, there is no reason to suppose that 
there is an objective lapse of time in our universe» (Savitt [1994, p. 468]).  
      [from 8 and 12] 
 
This reconstruction has the undeniable merit of being faithful to the text, as it is probably 
spells out what Gödel had in mind when he wrote:«if the experience of time can exist without 
an objective lapse of time, no reason can be given why an objective lapse of time should be 
assumed at all.» (Gödel [1949a, p. 561/1990, pp. 205-206]).  
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Such an epistemic interpretation of Gödel’s argument had already been anticipated, 
somewhat more concisely but less perspicuously, by Palle Yourgrau: «Since the ctual world 
is lawlike compossible with the Gödel universe, it follows that our direct experience of time 
is compatible with its ideality (assuming with Gödel, its ideality in the Gödel universe). But if 
even direct experience is inadequate to establish the existence of intuitive time – that is, not 
merely (relativistic) causal or cosmic time, but genuine, successive time that lapses or passes 
– then nothing further will suffice» (Yourgrau [1991, p. 53]). In a word, Yourgrau-Savitt’s 
epistemic argument weakens Gödel’s attempted conclusion, as it amounts to shifti g the 
burden of proof to the defenders of the reality of the time of our experience. 
The latest attempt at an evaluation of the gist of this argument is Earman’s, who, in the 
appendix to the chapter 6 of his [1995], examines Yourgrau’s version as is reported above 
and rejects it – he does not discuss Savitt [1994], as the paper was probably in press. Earman 
tells us that «apart from our experience, we have all sorts of evidence that lend strong 
support to the inference that we do not inhabit a Gödel type universe, but rather a universe 
that fulfills all of the geometrical conditions necessary for an objective lapse of time.» [1995, 
p.199].  
Unfortunately, it seems to me that Earman has misconstrued Gödel’s argument and 
Yourgrau’s main point. The crux of Gödel’s argument is not that our scientifically tutored 
experience, together with inferences to theoretical structures, does not suffice to establish that 
we live in a universe endowed with cosmic time, as Earman seems to have it. Rather, Gödel’s 
point, as correctly reconstructed by Yourgrau and Savitt, is that after the discovery of the 
rotating solutions to Einstein’s field equation, o r experience alone (without the help of 
independent arguments) is notsufficient for objective becoming, i.e., for establishing the 
existence of a mind-independent lapse of time. Since in the quotation above Earman himself 
explicitly recognizes that cosmic time would be a merely necessary condition for an objective 
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lapse of time, he cannot be interpreted as denying premise (11) above, namely that we have 
independent evidence for becoming because we have scientific evidence (as we do) for the 
existence of cosmic time. Consequently, if a realist about time and becoming wats to attack
Gödel’s argument, she must pick up Savitt’s challenge, and discuss his two premises, namely 
(10) and (11).  
Starting with the former, could the experience of the Gödelians be identical to ours? If we 
grant this point, obviously we deny that there exists a necessary link between what we 
experience and the structure of objective, cosmic time also in the actual world, and it may 
seem that Savitt’s premise, to a certain extent, simply begs the question. The point, however, 
is not that such a premise is question begging, but rather that since the logical and physical 
possibility of time travel is needed by Savitt for Gödel’s universe not to be ruled out a priori, 
it is certainly available to an antikantian (a realist about time) to claim that it is at leas  
physically possible that the experience of time of the “Gödelians” be very much unlike ours.14  
Savitt might perhaps defend his premise by invoking well-known technological difficulties 
entailed by time travel. Observers living in Gödel spacetime would presumably share our 
technological problems concerning the amount of acceleration and fuel needed to voyage into 
the past (Malament [1985]), and would not actually be traveling into the past, though it 
would be physically possible for them to do so. Moreover, we have to keep in mind that 
Savitt’s premise (10) merely relies on the physical possibility of their experiencing time 
exactly as we do, and this point is not touched by the mere possibility of time travel.  
If time travel in this context is a red herring, there is another difficulty that stands in the 
way of our accepting (10): to say that it physically possible for local observers living in 
Gödel’s spacetime to experience time as we do implies that it is physically possible for such 
observers to fail to see any trace of the future. This is highly doubtful, however, since it is 
certainly physically possible for them not to be screened off from causes that are later than 
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their effects, exactly because they live in a universe in each point of which a closed timelike 
curve can always be found! One can even argue that in Gödel spacetime th re mus  betraces 
of the future, since even if the Gödelians’ psychological arrow is directed along one direction 
of time, and that direction is picked out as the direction of time, some later events along that 
direction will have to be regarded as indirectly causing events in the observers’ present. So, 
especially if such observers live along timelike “loops” whose diameter is not very large,15 we 
can conclude that their experience of time would be relevantly different from ours, and 
Savitt’s basic premise would have to be abandoned. At this point, he might retort that for 
observers living on very large causal loops, causes that are later than their effects would be 
very improbable, and the technological difficulties of traveling into the past might just make 
their experience indistinguishable from ours.  
Leaving to the reader the difficult task of judging who is going to score on this uncertain 
point, let me strengthen my objection to Savitt’s argument by considering that also premise 
(11) is debatable: is our “direct experience of time” the only argument to believe in the 
objectivity of the lapse of time? Clearly, an evaluation of this claim depends on how to 
understand “our experience of time”, in particular the ambiguous and vague word 
“experience”. If Savitt means to claim that no argument in defense of an objective coming 
into existence is ever likely to come from physics (“experience” meant in a very wide sense, 
encompassing scientific knowledge), I think we must agree, because cosmic time cannot be 
regarded as sufficient for objective becoming. Furthermore, it is certainly not among physics’ 
aims to yield a distinction between physical systems or entities that are actual at a certain 
time and systems that are merely possible, and precisely this distinction is needed for 
becoming Consequently, in his argument “experience” must mean “scientifically untutored 
experience”. However, even in this restricted sense, “experience” can have two 
interpretations, a broad and a narrow one.  
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In a broad sense, one could refer to “experience” as it is coded in ordinary language, 
particularly in those concepts – o sibly a priori for the individual but a posteriori for the 
species – that have been acquired during our evolutionary history and that are tested, say, in 
experiments within the so-called naive physics. These “concepts” (time included) must 
possess some sort of adaptive value, in the sense that they must enable us to cope with the 
environment in a successful way, despite their approximation and possible lack of precision 
for purposes of the scientific description of the world. If we interpret “experience” in such a 
broad evolutionary, not purely psychological, sense, we may evn grant Savitt’s premise 
(11), by remarking at the same time that the adaptive value of our naive concepts of “object” 
and “property” may justify some sort of general, defeasible “folk realism”, telling us that 
such objects and their properties are prim  facie real. Rather than calling into question and 
“eliminate” what Sellars [1962] used to call “the manifest image” (the world of our 
experience), we may temporarily adopt its ontology, u til conflicts with the “scientific 
image” force us to abandon it. On his hypothesis, however, why doubt that there is 
something mind-i ependent that our experience of time is about, if in our model of the 
universe no scientific fact is in direct conflict with it? In our universe, unlike Gödel’s, one 
can be a folk realist about becoming since a necessary condition for it – cosmic time – is 
indeed satisfied. In this line of argument, rather than arguing directly for the reliability of our 
experience of time, one could begin by defending, indirectly, some sort of folk realism, which 
would then support in a non-ad-hoc way also our “natural belief” in objective becoming, once 
conflicts with known physical theories are shown to be absent. 
If, on the other hand, “experience” is given a narrower, purely psychological reading, isn’t 
it quite hazardous to deny, at the present moment, that any fu ure philosophical arguments 
constructed to prove the reality of the lapse of time must fail? For instance, Tooley [1997] 
has recently given an important argument in favor of the unreality of the future based on 
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causation, not on our “psychological” experience. How can we exclude that forthcoming and 
more sophisticated arguments will succeed without calling into question our mental set-ups?  
In sum, I don’t mean to suggest that Savitt’s reconstruction of Gödel’s argument is not 
interesting and persuasive, but only that it is not conclusive to establish the mind-dependence 
of becoming or the ideality of time in the sense of Kant. In the remainder of the paper, I will 
pick up Savitt’s challenge (recall the shift of the burden of proof) by defending the mind-
independence of a somewhat “deflated”, minimalist and tenseless notion of becoming, which 
concerns our experience only in the broader, non-psychol gical sense mentioned above. As 
we are about to see, such a notion is nevertheless a satisfactory explication of our intuitive 
notion of time 
 
5. Becoming as real occurrence of events and facts 
 
My suggestion is to explicate, or rather simply equate becoming with the notion of “taking 
place” or “occurring”, which is also the natural way to understand change in Broad’s 
absolute, non-qualitative sense referred to above: 
Def: Becoming is real if and only if events successively and mind-independently take place at 
their own proper time of occurrence.16 
Given that it is non-controversial to grant that for an event to occur at a time just means for it 
to exist at that time, the task that still remains is to show that the proposed, minimalistic 
equivalence between ‘coming into existence at time t’ (Gödel’s change) and ‘occurring 
(existing) at that time’ captures the essential features of our pre-the retical intuitions about 
becoming and the passage of time. 
The solution we are after is simple if we identify the lapse of time with the view, dearest to 
our intuition, that the “present coincides with the existing”. By relativizing this claim to a 
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time t, we get that at t only events simultaneous with (present at) t exist, where “existence” is 
here understood in a relational, tenseless sense, given by “existence at a date/ ime”. Capturing 
this intuition in our explication of becoming is therefore indispensable to make the latter 
adequate, and it seems to me that Gödel has understood this essential point better than any 
other philosopher before or after him. Consider the following, precious but strangely 
neglected quotation: «For that time elapses and change exists means […] that at any moment 
of time only a certain portion of the facts composing the world exists objectively (and 
different portions at different moments)» [Gödel 1995, p. 235]. Provided that the notion of 
occurring at a certain proper time is mind-independent – why deny that “things occur” and 
“events happen” without our taking notice of them? – the thesis that only the present exists 
(even formulated in the relativized way seen above) is sufficient to claim that events and facts 
come into existence (and cease to exist) mind-indepe ently.  
In fact, how can two temporally separated events co xi t in a tenseless sense if, at any 
instant of (cosmic) time t, only events occurring at t exist (at that time)? For any two 
temporally separated, instantaneous events e and f, the earlier of the two must cease to exist 
when the other comes into being, provided that “event e com s i o being (into existence) at 
t” (tenseless becoming) simply means “ occurs or happens at t” or “e is present at 
(simultaneous with) t”. The first, essential question we must face, then, is whether, and in 
what sense, events can be said to coexist tenselessly in the same possible world (spacetime), 
or alternatively, which arguments we have to defend the view that only what occurs at t exists 
at that time. The other problem is to show that such a relational, tenseless view of becoming 
is a faithful explication of our experience of time and pass ge. Let us examine these two 
issues in turn. 
The argument to defend the view that at time t only what then occurs exists as of that time 
may run as follows. For simplicity, imagine a universe in which time has a discrete ordering, 
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composed only of instant  1 and 2, with two causally connectible, instantaneous events, E1 
and E2, occurring at those temporally separated instants. At t1, E2 rivially doesn’t exist (both 
in a tenseless and in a tensed sense of ‘existence’), simply because, by definition, E2 occurs 
at the different ime t2!17 In fact, if ‘occurring at t’ and ‘existing at t’ must be regarded as 
perfectly interchangeable, tenseless expressions, it follows that at time t1, E2 does not exist, 
otherwise E2 would exist at all times (that is, in our simplified model, it would exist also at 
t1), which is absurd. Therefore, since at time t1 E1 exists (occurs) and E2 doesn’t (in the 
perfectly acceptable tenseless sense seen above), o e can safely assume that E2 comes into 
being at 2, by simply happening or taking place at that time. Conversely, since E1 exists
(occurs) only at t1, at t2 it ceases to exist, since at that time E2 is the only existing event.  
By defending such a tenseless and relational view of becoming, one can readily join 
Williams [1951] in arguing that the flow of time interpreted in a l teral sense is inconsistent, 
because of notorious difficulties with questions like “how fast does the present flow”? Of 
course, renouncing this view is certainly not a sacrifice, because the explication of becoming 
proposed here – by broaching this problem we come to the second issue anticipated above – 
does indeed save two essential tenets of the commonsensical view of time: 
(i) At any instant of time, only what is present at that time exists, since both the 
past and the future at that time don’t exist (both in the tensed sense of existence, 
given by “existing now” and in a perfectly acceptable tenseless sense, given by 
‘existence at a date/time’)18;  
(ii) an absolute change in what exists can be regarded as objective, since it 
coincides with the successive coming into being (occurring) of events either (a) 
at different instants of a global, cosmic time, if the latter is indeed available, or 
(b) at instants of a local, proper time along a particular worldline.  
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I argue that such a successive coming into being of events at different moments of time is the 
mind-independent, objective core lying behind the subjective sense of literal passage of one 
time over another, which, admittedly, is engendered by our memory of events that don’t exist 
any more and our anticipations of events that are yet to happen, fused together in a unique but 
continuously changing present experience. The changing of such an experience can be 
explained only with the successive coming into being of events and states of affair at their 
time of occurrence. 
It is in this sense that I think that such a minimalist view of becoming, that in the literature 
has never been clearly formulated, can be regarded as a tertium quid between, and therefore 
as a dissolution of, some of the main contentions between the two camps (the “A” and the 
“B”) in which the analytic philosophy of time of the 20th century has been divided: despite 
the fact that tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions – as urged by Mellor [1981] and 
Faye [1989] – becoming must be regarded, contrary to the typical B-theorists’ view, as a 
mind-independent feature of the universe.19 At any instant of a cosmic or local time, 
tenselessly conceived events and facts do come into being as objectively as it gets, for the 
simple reasons that at any instant of time, only events occurring at that instant exist (in the 
two senses seen above), and such events do not occur all at once, but in succession. 
Furthermore,  once we realize that it does not make sense to ask how fast events do come into 
being, because coming into being at t just means occurring at that time and not existing 
before, the ghost of the infinite regress, imported by misleading metaphors of motion through 
space of a reified now, vanishes. 
Incidentally, we should note that the view that mind-independent occurring (on the part of 
events) is sufficient for becoming is not completely new, since it has been implicitly defended 
by authors that are usually identified as arch-enemies of becoming, like Eddington: «events 
do not happen, they are just there and we come across them» [1920, p. 51), and Weyl «the 
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objective world simply is, it does not happen» [1949, p. 116]. I claim that these oft-quoted 
passages, whose true meaning has escaped us, are theonly coher nt formulations of a 
becomingless world, i.e., a world in which events literally don’  occur, but simply are.  
It should be obvious why both Weyl and Eddington defended this view with respect to 
STR. Given that in this theory the temporal order is only partial, events that are usually 
defined, as in Kim’s theory [1976], by a triple constituted by a substance, a property and a 
(coordinate) time, would have to be regarded as having an identity which depends on an 
arbitrary choice of an inertial frame. In this case, it may appear more plausible to assume, as 
Eddington and Weyl did, that events don’t occur at all, but simply are, or tenselessly coexist 
in the block view of the universe. If my reading of those oft-quoted passages is correct, these 
two philosophers had already realized what I am urging here, namely that for the reality of 
change and of temporal becoming, the reality of “occurrence” suffices. This, in its turn, 
implies that as soon as we grant that in a general relativistic spacetime endowed with aglobal 
time order events can objectively and mind-independently occur in succession, we thereby 
introduce a change in what is real at different instants of time for the reasons given above, 
and therefore a tenseless form of becoming at a cosmic time t. It is ertainly more difficult to 
defend a local, worldline-dependent becoming in the Minkowskian setting, since the present 
there does not extend in space but must be identified with a point (the “here-n w). Howev , 
this is the topic for a different paper. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Even if the argument above in favor of becoming were not judged to be conclusive, what 
matter most for my purpose is that the adoption of a relativized and tenseless notion of 
becoming yields a coherent alternative to its mind-dependence and to the block view. We can 
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adopt the view from no-when of the block universe, a God’s eye point of view, which 
describes entities that are temporally extended sub specie aeternitatis, or we can resort to a 
relationist, perspectival description of reality, which refers existence to a particular “point of 
view” or instant of time. If both are compatible with know physical theories, the choice 
between them can be only be a matter of overall coherence with what else we know about the 
universe. 
The reasons to prefer the latter view are not only pragmatic, i.e., given by the fact that we 
are temporally located beings. The former view, by regarding the difference between p sent 
and future events as identical to the difference between here and there, makes our experience 
of time utterly unexplainable, and in principle not describable in physicalistic or even 
naturalistic terms. In fact, how can I act to produce or bring about a future event e if e 
coexists (tenselessly) with the time of my action in the same sense in which a past event 
exists? Within the perspectival, relationist option, causation can be regarded as an 
ontologically loaded notion: from the perspective of a region R, from my present action is 
located, events occurring in the later region R’ don’t exist (tenselessly or tensedly), and an 
event in R (my action) literally brings about those in R’ by causing them. 
If what I am trying to argue is correct, it follows that a somewhat deflated version of 
objective becoming must be reintroduced, one that is quivalent to the notion that events 
mind-independently occur at a certain proper time and place. If the proper time of a single, 
fundamental particle (observer) can be extended to a cosmic time as in standard Robertson-
Walker cosmologies, becoming ca  be regarded as being independent of the varying lapses of 
time associated to different timelike curves, and, as such, it passes the test of intersubjective 
validity. If there is a perfectly legitimate sense in which physical events belonging to any 
relativistic spacetime (also Minkowski’s) exist only at their proper time and place of 
occurrence – no interpretation of relativity forces us to abandon this trivially simple remark – 
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it should be clear why this view of becoming entails some sort of rapprochementbetween the 
so-called static view of time and the dynamic view: the only existing facts are tenseless (facts 
at times) but their becoming or coming into being at instants of cosmic or local time is a real, 
though physically unexplainable feature of the universe. 
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frequent exchange via e-mail helped me to formulate my views in a clearer way. Despite some criticism that 
here I raise to his previous, thought-provoking work, he has now independently come to defend views about 
temporal becoming that are very close to mine, as is evident from the paper in this collection. 
2 See Rietdijk [1966], Putnam [1967], Stein [1968, 1991], Weingard [1972], Godfrey-Smith [1979], Maxwell 
[1985], Dieks [1988], Clifton and Hogarth [1995], Dorato [1996, 2000], Rakic [1997], Tooley [1997], and Savitt 
[2000] among others. 
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3 For a recent survey on the debate between the A and the B theories of time – whose formulation dates back to 
McTaggart [1908] – see Le Poidevin [1998]. For reasons that will become clear in the following, rather than 
referring to the debate by using the misleading terms “tensed” and “tenseless” theories of time, I pref r the more 
neutral “A” and “B” theories of time.  
4 The pun of “tangential” refers to the validity of STR in planes that are tangent to each point of a Riemannian 
manifold of GTR. The pun is in Savitt [2000]. 
5 Saunders [1996] offers a brief discussion of cosmic time in the context of Gödel’s argument, and defends a 
relational view of tenses with which this paper is in complete agreement, though he would probably disagree 
with the view of becoming presented here. Yourgrau’s [1991], Savitt’s [1994] and Earman’s [1995] 
contributions will be discussed below.
6 Of course, GTR might end up being a phenomenological, derived theory as well. However, until a reasonably 
agreed upon quantum theory of gravity is available, we can assume that GTR i  a fund mental physical theory. 
7 Here I follow Tooley [1997], who has convincingly argued that granting (as I do) (1) that the truth-conditions 
of tensed sentences are given by tenseless sentences and (2) that tenses are relations, does not yet solve the 
problem of becoming and of the ontological status of future events, which is what I am after here. 
8 Though Stein [1970] had already stressed its philosophical significance. 
9 The English word used by Gödel, “lapse” comes from the Latin labi, which means to flow. So lapse of time is 
equivalent to flow of time, in the way to be clarified below.  
10 “Exist” here is meant in a tenseless sense, given by “existing at a time”. 
11 As anticipated in note 1, this is the line also taken by Savitt in his contribution to this volume. As a matter of 
fact, we arrived independently to the same conclusion about the importance of carefully distinguishing absolute 
change from ordinary qualitative change in Broad’s sense. 
12 “Prevailing”, however, does not mean all: witness the contemporary theoretical physicist Rovelli, and the way 
he concludes his overview of the problem of time in quantum gravity: «If time is the order of the changes in the 
states of the systems, and if the state of a system is a relational notion, one that has meaning only if referred to 
an observer, can there be time outside the observer/observed relation? Is perhaps time precisely what emerges 
from this observer/observed relation? Is time precisely such a relation?». Rovelli [1997, p.217]. 
13 For a vivid representation of this situation, I refer the reader to the picture in Malament [1985]. See also Savitt 
[1994, note 10]. 
14 Of course, Savitt acknowledges that after a bit of scientific development, the gödelians might discover that 
there is no cosmic time in their universe, .e., no necessary structure for the existence of an objective lapse of 
time [1994, p. 467].  
15 This remark was raised by Joos Uffink during the discussion of the paper. 
16 Interestingly, the etymology of ‘event’ betrays an original, revealing image of motion through space, as the 
word comes from the Latin verb advenire, literally “to arrive”, “to come from”, which is then extended 
metaphorically to temporal matters to mean “to occur, “to happen”, where such happenings are changes. 
17 For the purpose of rebutting charges of fatalism allegedly entailed by the tenseless view of time, this point has 
been correctly noted already by Oaklander [1994, 1998]. However, I think that he has not drawn its 
philosophical consequences for the view that he himself defends about b coming (he is against it). 
18 The fact, urged by Savitt, that other senses of tenseless existence are on the ground (“existing at all times” is 
one) is irrelevant in our context. 
19 For a number of B-theorists defending the mind-dependence of the difference between past, present and 
future, see Russell [1915], Grünbaum [1963], Faye [1989], and Mellor [1998]. Not all B theorist defend the 
mind-dependence of becoming: J. Butterfield (private communication) is an exception. 
